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PROTECTION OF OFFICERS WHO ACT UNDER
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES
BY MAX P

RAPACZ*

B Y the great weight of authority a public officer who acts under a statute which has subsequently been declared unconstitutional cannot successfully rely on the statute as a defense to
a suit brought against him to recover damages caused by the attempted enforcement of the statute.' Sheriffs, constables, justices
of the peace and other inferior officers, even when acting in a
judicial capacity, have been held liable in damages to parties injured by the attempted enforcement of unconstitutional statutes.
Nevertheless, there are a number of well-reasoned cases holding
that an officer who has acted in good faith in enforcing such statutes is not liable.
Prior to 1880 there seems to have been absolute uniformity
in holding officers liable for injuries resulting from the enforcement of unconstitutional acts. The only exception was in cases
where the officer executed a warrant fair on its face. In such
cases the officer was exempt from liability even though his action
was one step in the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.2
The officer was not expected to go back of the warrant to determine whether it was issued under a valid law But in 1880 the
Iowa supreme court departed from the old rule and laid the foundation for the minority rule.3 In the case of Henke v. McCord the
Iowa court carefully re-examined the whole problem of liability
in such cases and reached an independent conclusion that the ma*Instructor in Political Science, University of Wisconsin.
123 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., 369; Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations,
8th ed., 382-84.
2
Trammell v. Russelville, (1879) 34 Ark. 105, 36 Am. Rep. 1.
3
Henke v. McCord, (1880) 55 Iowa 378, 7 N. V 623.
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jority view was unsound, and today the case is regarded as the
leading authority in support of the minority view. The writer,
upon an analysis of the reasoning in the cases supporting the majority and minority views, has reached the same conclusion as
the Iowa court, and it will be one of the objects of this article to
point out the unsoundness of the majority view.
The reason most generally given for holding the officer liable
is expressed in the following quotation from Norton v. Shelby
County.4

"An unconstitutional statute is not a law; it confers no rights;
it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office;
it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never
been passed."
The theory of the majority view is that the statute which has
been declared unconstitutional is void ab initio and totally without effect. Of course, if we take that view of statutes which have
been declared unconstitutional, it follows logically that the statute
can offer no protection to the officer, and the courts which accept
that view concern themselves almost entirely with determining
whether the statute under which the officer acted is constitutional
or unconstitutional. If they find that the statute is unconstitutional, they almost automatically hold that the officer is liable on the
theory that he has acted without the authority of law. Hence,
if it can be demonstrated that the "void ab initio" doctrine is
unsound, we shall have gone a long way in eliminating the main
argument of the courts which hold the officer liable.
Although it is generally stated in the cases and by writcrs'
that unconstitutional statutes are void ab initio and of no effect,
it is submitted that the statements are too broad and that the rule
of Norton v. Shelby County cannot be applied, without some
limitation, in a majority of cases involving the constitutionality of
statutes. There is another view of unconstitutional statutes which
requires consideration. It is the view that such statutes have the
effect of law until they are declared unconstitutional by the courts.
This is the view taken by the courts which hold that the officer
is not liable in the type of case under consideration in this study.
Where criminal proceedings have been brought against the officer
because of the attempted enforcement of an unconstitutional statute, he has been protected.6 Or, suppose that the statute is held
4(1885) 118 U. S. 425, 6 Sup. Ct. 1121, 30 L. Ed. 178.
5

Even such an eminent writer as Cooley repeats the statement without

any 6qualification. See Cooley, Constitutional Limitations. 8th ed. 382.
State v. Goodwin, (1898) 123 N. C. 697, 31 S. E. 221.
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constitutional today and that a year later the state supreme court
reverses itself ; that within the year a municipality had issued
bonds pursuant to the statute? The federal courts hold that the
statute is to be regarded as if it were constitutional for the period
that the decision sustaining the statute was in force so far at
least as necessary to uphold contracts made in the interim.- Again,
suppose that a statute was declared unconstitutional as contrary to
the federal constitution and that later Congress permits the states
to enter the previously prohibited field? It has been held that the
old state statutes are revived without a reenactment by the legislature$
Another strong argument against the doctrine of Norton v.
Shelby County is found in cases which fall in. the class with Shephard v. Wheeling? and Allison v. Corker0 which hold that the
statute is void only with reference to the particular claims based
upon it. In Shephard v. Wheeling the court said:
". .. it does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it, and
determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no
existence. The court may give its reasons for ignoring or disregarding the statute, but the decision affects the parties only, and
there is no judgment against the statute. The opinions or reasons
of the court may operate as a precedent for the determination of
other similar cases, but it does not strike the statute from the
statute books; it does not . . . repeal the statute. The parties to

that suit are concluded by the judgment, but no one else is bound.
A new litigant may bring a new suit upon the very same statute,
and t!te former decision cannot be pleaded as an estoppel, but can
be relied on only as a precedent. This constitutes tie reason and
the basis of the fundamental rule that a court will never pass upon
the constitutionality ,of a statute unless it is absolutely necessary to
do so in order -to decide the cause before it."
From what has been said above it is clear that the doctrine of
Norton v. Shelby County cannot be applied, without limitation, to
all cases where the constitutionality of §tatutes is involved. Thus,
it appears that the main prop in the reasoning of the courts which
support the majority view does not rest on a sound foundation."
7

Gelpcke v. Dubuque, (1864) 1 Wall. (U.S.) 175, 17 L. Ed. 520.

sIn re Rahrer, (1891) 140 U. S. 545, 11 Sup. Ct. 865, 35 L. Ed. 572;
McCollum v. McConaughy, (1909) 141 Iowa 172, 119 N. W. 539.

9(1887) 30 W. Va. 479, 4 S. E. 635.

10(1902) 67 N. J. L. 596, 52 Adt. 362.
"'For a more detailed discussion of the Effect of Unconstitutional
Statutes see an article by 0. P. Field, 1 Ind. L. Jour. 1, 60 Am. Law Rev.
232.
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A second reason advanced by some courts in support of the
majority rule is that everyone is presumed to know the law, and
therefore, if an officer acts under an unconstitutional enactment of
the legislature, he does so at his peril and must. suffer the consequences. That was the main argument of the court in Sumner v.
Beeler 12 which is the leading case supporting the view that the
officer is liable. Of course, such reasoning is open to criticism for even if the officer knows the words of the statute, he
may not be able to guess correctly on its constitutionality. It seems
grossly unjust to compel an officer of ordinary ability to make a
guess which may result to his detriment when even the judges
of our highest courts cannot agree as to whether a particular act
is constitutional. In Sumner v. Beeler the statute was declared
unconstitutional because the subject matter of the act was not
expressed in the title of the act as required by the constitution."'
At the time the act was declared unconstitutional, there was a
vigorous dissent by two judges; and yet we penalize a minor officer who acted under it because he did not think the same as the
majority of the judges of a supreme court if he thought about the
matter at all.
There is another group of cases in which the courts seek to
justify this doctrine of holding the officer liable on the ground
that when a statute is unconstitutional there is no duty on anyone
to obey it and no duty on the officer to enforce it. 14

The argument

is made that the officer might have waited until someone brought
mandamus proceedings against him and then the constitutionality
of the statute could have been tested before anyone was harmed.
On grounds of policy this argument is held impracticable by the
courts holding the minority view. If the officer adopted the attitude of waiting to enforce laws until someone stirs him to action.
many of our laws would never be enforced. Then too, there are
many states which hold .that a ministerial officer cannot question
the constitutionality of statutes in mandamus proceedings against
him. The courts in those states take the attitude that it is the duty
of the officer to enforce the law as he finds it. It will depend
12(1875) 50 Ind. 341, 19 Am. Rep. 718.

13
The statute involved in Sumner v. Beeler was held unconstitutional
in State
v. Young, (1896) 47 Ind. 150.
14
County Commissioners of Wyandotte County v. Kansas City Ft. &
S. & M. R. Co., (1896) 5 Kan. App. 43, 47 Pac. 326; Campbell v. Bryant,
(1905) 104 Va. 509,52 S. E. 638; Campbell v. Sherman, (1874) 35 Wis. 103:
State ex rel. University of Utah v. Candaland, (1909) 36 Utah 406, 104
Pac. 285, 140 Am. St. Rep. 834: Norton v. Shelby County, (1886) 118
U. S. 425, 6 Sup. Ct. 1121, 30 L. Ed. 178.
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largely upon the type of mandamus statute in the particular state
,whether the officer can raise the question of constitutionality.
An important consideration in originally fastening responsibility on the officer was the fact that in many of the cases there
was no other convenient party upon whom the responsibility
could be placed, and in their desire to protect private property
rights the courts made the innocent officer, who faithfully tried
to enforce the laws, bear the burden. Under the old doctrine
that "the king can do no wrong" the government could not be
held liable for the torts of its officers, and in principle it still remains true that the federal government and practically all the
states deny responsibility for the torts of their officers and employees. 1 Since the government could not be held liable the
king's officers were frequently held responsible for their torts,
ahd the American courts adopted the sane policy. The courts
seem to feel that as between the individual property owner and
the officer the former ought to be protected. Though the courts
do not say point blank that they hold the officer liable because
there is no one else who can be held, there is that sentiment behind their arguments.

In Yale College v. Sanger,0 in enjoining

the state treasurer from diverting the income from certain land
scrip, the court said:
"It is equally well settled that an officer of the state who, as
an aggressor, invades the private or vested pecuniary rights of an
individual in his specific or real property, cannot, in a suit at law
against him for his tort, or in a bill in equity to restrain the commission of the intended injury, when adequate relief cannot be
otherwise afforded, successfully justify his conduct upon the
ground that he is acting in obedience to the authority of an unconstitutional state statute."
Where the officer attempts to enforce the statute after it has
been declared unconstitutional by the courts, he is enjoined,'- and
no doubt all courts would hold him liable for any injury done,
for there would be no ground on which his action could be justified and there is no need of protecting the officer in such cases.
In a number of the cases holding the officer liable the question
has been raised whether it is not really a suit against the state
and therefore prohibited under the eleventh amendment of the
federal constitution. The question seems to have been first raised
15For an elaborate discussion of government liability in tort see E. M.
Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L Jour. 1, 129, 229 and
36 Yale L. Jour. 1.
16(C.C.
Conn. 1894) 62 Fed. 177.
17Woolsey v. Commercial Bank, (C.C. 7th cir. 1854) 6 McLean 142.
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in the federal Supreme Court in Osborn v. Bank of United States.'I
Marshall in that case held that the eleventh amendment was not
applicable unless the state was a party to the record. But such
a construction had the effect of nullifying the amendment and so
it was rejected in Poindexter v. Greenhow ' where the court
worked out a new rule which takes into consideration the effect
that the decision will have upon the state. If the state is the real
party in interest and the decree would operate adversely against
the state, it is still to be considered a suit against the state though
an officer is the nominal defendant. So suits against the higher
officials may turn out to be suits against the state20 and thus the
officer may be protected if he acted in his official capacity in enforcing the unconstitutional act.
The argument advanced by the courts when they hold that it
is not a suit against the state when an officer is being sued in
connection with the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute
is that there was no state action. They regard the officer as a
private wrongdoer who has acted without the authority of law. 2'
Such reasoning is only a fiction, for the action of the officer is exactly the same when he acts to enforce a statute which later proves
to be unconstitutional, as it is when he enforces a constitutional
statute. But the result of resorting to the fiction is that in most
cases, unless the state treasury is going to be affected, it will not
be regarded as a suit against the state and the officer will be subject to suit. Though suits will not lie against state officers where
the treasury would be affected, suits will be entertained by the
courts quite readily where the suit is brought to enjoin the officer
from enforcing an unconstitutional statute where serious injury
to property rights would result, and it will not be considered a
22
suit against the state under the eleventh amendment.
9 Wheat. (U.S.) 738, 6 L. Ed. 204.
19(1884)
114 U. S. 270, 5 Sup. Ct. 903, 962, 29 L. Ed. 185.
0
- Kentucky v. Dennison, (1860) 24 How. (U.S.) 66 16 L. Ed. 717.
-lIn Poindexter v. Greenhow, (1884) 114 U. S. 270. 5 Sup. Ct. 903,
962, 29 L. Ed. 185, the court said: "The case, then, of the plaintiff is
reduced to this. He paid the taxes demanded of him by a lawful tender.
The defendant has no authority of law thereafter to attempt to enforce
other payments by seizing his property. In so doing, he ceased to be an
officer of the law, and became a private wrongdoer." To the same effect
see Saratoga State Waters Corporation v. Pratt, (1920) 227 N. Y. 429. 125
N. E. 834.
-Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, (1890) 140 U. S. 1, 11 Sup. Ct. 699, 35
L. Ed. 363; Scott v. Donald, (1897) 165 U. S. 107, 17 Sup. Ct. 262, 41
L Ed. 648; Davis v. Gray, (1872) 16 Wall. (U.S.) 203, 21 L, Ed. 447.
Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, (1912) 223 U. S. 605, 32 Sup. Ct. 340, 56
L. Ed. 570; Bonnett v. Vallier, (1908) 136 Wis. 193, 116 N. W. 885, 128
Am. St. Rep. 1061.
is(1824)
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It does not seem possible to lay down any rule by which the
courts are guided in determining when we have a suit against the
state. Each decision seems to depend upon the facts of the particular case and it seems that had the courts desired to protect the
officers, they might have held more generally that it really -was a
suit against the state. In fact, it would have been a very logical
thing to have so held in all cases where the officer was being sued
in connection with the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.
If the courts had taken that more liberal attitude towards protecting the officers, there is little doubt that the legislatures would
have made provision for protecting those who were injured by
the enforcement of statutes which later proved to be unconstitutional.
Judging from the positiveness of some of the expressions used
by the courts which hold officers liable, one might be led to the
conclusion that there is only one side to the question of liability
of officers who act under unconstitutional statutes.23 But as a
matter of fact there are decisions in at least seven states which
gave protection to the officers in one respect or another; and one
which protected all the parties who
decision in a federal court 24
acted under an invalid ordinance,2 including the person who
made the complaint.
It seems that the reasoning of the courts which protect the
officer is more convincing than that of the courts holding the majority view. In Henke vz. _McCord,2 ' which is the leading case
supporting the minority view, the court held that the justice of
the peace was not liable where he had issued the warrant for the
seizure of liquor under an invalid ordinance. The court con23
in Sumner v. Beeler, (1875) 50 Ind. 341, 19 Am. Rep. 718, the court
said: "No question is better settled . . .than that ministerial officers and
other persons are liable for acts done under an act of the legislature which
is unconstitutional and void." The court does not cite a single case in
support of its decision. It just assumes that if the statute is unconstitutional, the defendants who acted under it are liable. And again in Osborn
v. Bank of United States, (1824) 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 738, 6 L. Ed. 204, the
Supreme Court said: "The counsel for the appellants are too intelligent.
and have too much self respect, to pretend that a void act can afford any
to the officers who executed it."
protection
2
Borhi v. Barnett, (C.C.A. 7th cir. 1906) 75 C. C. A. 327, 144 Fed.
389. 25
The courts seem to make no distinction whether it was a statute or
a municipal ordinance that was involved. The city ordinances are regarded
the same as legislative acts for the purpose of considering constitutionality.
See Davis and Farnum Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, (1903) 189 U. S.207,
23 Sup. Ct. 498, 47 L. Ed. 778.
2C(1880) 55 Iowa 378. 7 N. W. 623.
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cluded that the justice had acted in a judicial capacity"l and having been called upon to exercise his judicial powers the court held
that he ought not to be liable for mere errors of judgment when
acting strictly within his jurisdiction. The same argument is advanced by a number of other courts which hold that the officer is
not liable.2 8 Another argument advanced by some courts for exempting the officer from liability is that imposing liability on the
officers impedes the enforcement of the laws and weakens the
whole structure of government.2 The courts which advance this
argument doubt the advisability of allowing every officer of the
government to question the constitutionality of every statute before proceeding to enforce it. They feel that the constitutionality
of statutes ought to be determined by the higher courts. If that
view is sound, and it seems that it is, it logically follows that the
officer ought not to be held liable if the statute happens to be declared unconstitutional.
Still other courts would excuse the officer on the theory that
there is a presumption that all legislative enactments are constitutional and are to be regarded as law until declared void by the
courts." And it is a fixed rule in constitutional law that the
courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes unless it
is essential to the disposition of the case at hand and even then,
they will regard the statutes as constitutional until it is demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutes are unconstitutional. 31 Now, if judges receive the benefit of such a presumption, surely the officer ought also to be permitted to indulge in
the presumption. In Ortman v. Greenman, 2 a justice of the peace
who tried the case held a statute unconstitutional; on appeal the
supreme court of Michigan disapproved of the action of the justice on the theory that only the highest judicial tribunals shotuld
27

For other cases holding that a justice of the peace is not liable for'
enforcing an invalid ordinance because he acts in a judicial capacity, see

Bohri v. Barnett, (C.C.A. 7th cir. 1906) 75 C. C. A. 327, 144 Fed. 389:
Brooks v. Mangan, (1891) 86 Mich. 576, 49 N. W. 633, 24 Am. St. Rep. 137.
28Goodwin v. Guild, (1895) 94 Tenn. 486, 29 S. W. 721; and Trammell

v. Russelville, (1879) 34 Ark. 105, 36 Am. Rep. 1, in which cases mayors
were held not liable for attempting to enforce an invalid ordinance on the
ground that they were acting in a judicial capacity.

-9Goodwin v. Guild, (1895) 94 Tenn. 486, 29 S. W. 721; Brooks v.
Mangan, (1891) 86 Mich. 576, 49 N. W. 633, 24 Am. St. Rep. 137.
3OBirdsell v. Smith, (1909) 158 Mich. 390, 122 N. W. 626; State v.
Goodwin, (1898) 123 N. C. 697, 31 S. E. 221; Dexter v. Alfred, (1892)
64 Hun
636, 19 N. Y. S. 770.
31
See R. E. Cushman, Constitutional Decisions by a Bare majority of
the Court, 19 Mich. L. Rev. 771.
32(1856) 4 Mich. 291.
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pass upon questions of constitutionality and only after great deliberation. And, in State v. Kelsey,33 a new Jersey court had this
to say:
"Statutes are not avoidable even by judicial decision except
upon very satisfactory grounds; and nothing short of absolute
certainty with respect to the entire validity of an act would afford
an excuse to an officer for his refusal to execute it. Any less
stringent rule of official conduct in such a respect would be a public evil of great magnitude. For a financial agent of the government to refrain from putting into operation a legislative policy
plainly evidenced by a formal enactment, acting on his own judgment, unassisted by any judicial tribunal, would unless in the
instance of such clear illegality that the flaw would be at once admitted by every enlightened mind, be inconsistent with every dictate of law and public policy."
The above quotation expresses the general attitude of the
courts as to the duty of the officer; so it may be asked how can
the same courts justify holding the officer liable if the statute tinder which he acted is pronounced invalid? It can well be argued
that officers as well as others have a duty to obey the law and that
to hold the officer liable is to punish him for his obedience to the
law. Still other judges stress the principle of fairness and justice to the officer who acts in good faith. 34
A comparison of the liability of judges with the liability of
other law-enfoi-cing officers shows that the former, who are better educated and in a better position to know what the law is, are
more adequately protected. Judges of superior courts are not liable for errofs of judgment, or when they act in excess of their
jurisdiction; or if acting within their jurisdiction, they are not
liable even if they act corruptly and maliciously.3 5 judges of inferior courts who act in excess of their jurisdiction are generally
held liable.30 But if the judge of an inferior court keeps within his
jurisdiction, he is generally not held liable though he acted erroneously,3 - or without due care,3 or corruptly and maliciously."
33(1882) 44 N. J. L. 1.
34See Henke v. McCord, (1880) 55 Iowa 378, 7 N. W. 623; State v.
Goodwin, (1898) 123 N. C. 697, 31 S. E. 221 and Bohri v. Barnett, (C.C.A.
7th cir.
1906) 75 C. C. A. 327, 144 Fed. 389.
5
3 On Liability of Judges generally see note to Kelly v. Bemis, (1855)
4 Gray (Mass.) 83, 64 Am. Dec. 50; Biddle, Liability of Officers Acting
in a Judicial Capacity. 15 Am. L. Rev. 427, 492; notes 14 L R. A. 138;
also Burdick, Torts, 3d ed. 35; Cooley, Torts, 3d ed. 797; Bradley v.
Fisher, (1871) 13 Wall. (U.S.) 335, 20 L. Ed. 646
3623 Cyc. 567-570; Cooley, Torts 3d ed. 797; Waterville v. Barton.
(1876) 64 Me. 321; Vanderpool v. State, (1879) 34 Ark. 174; Piper v.
Pearson, (1854) 2 Gray (Mass.) 120, 61 Am. Dec. 438; Clarke v. May,
(1854)7 2 Gray (Mass.) 410.
3 Cope v. Ramsey. (1870) 2 Heisk. (Tenn.) 197; Fausler v. Parsons.
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Surely there is as much reason for exempting the inferior officer
from liability, in cases where he attempted to enforce an unconstitutional statute before it was declared invalid, as there is for
exempting judges who act maliciously and corruptly. It seems
that of the two classes of officers, the inferior officer has the more
difficult task in the matter of doing his duty and still avoiding
encroachment upon the rights of others.
Of course, if we regard the officer as acting in excess of his
jurisdiction when attempting to enforce an unconstitutional statute, we can get no arguments from the cases dealing with the
liability of judges of inferior courts, in support of the proposition that the officer ought not to be held liable. But certainly the
reasoning of the cases which hold that judges, including those of
inferior courts, are not liable when acting within their jurisdiction, though they act corruptly and maliciously, can be fairly
urged in behalf of the officer who attempted to enforce an unconstitutional act. The judges are exempted on the theory that
they could not enforce the laws impartially and fearlessly if
litigants could annoy them with suits whenever they felt aggrieved.
The same argument applies with equal force to the other officers.
The probability of a lawsuit and of financial loss is as likely to
make the officer timid as it is the judge.
Since judges of superior courts are never held liable when they
act judicially and within their jurisdiction, though their action
(1873) 6 W. Va. 486; 20 Am. Ren. 431; Alexander v. Gill, (1891) 130 Ind.
485, 3 N. E. 525; McIntosh v. Bullard, (1910) 95 Ark. 227, 129 S. W. 85:
Willis8 v. Linn, (1912) 148 Ky. 841, 148 S. W. 11.
3 Ayers v. Russel, (1888) 50 Hun 282, 3 N. Y. S. 338, 20 N. Y. St.
Rep.39323.
The writer had thought that judges of inferior courts were liable
generally if they acted corruptly and maliciously, but Cooley, Torts, 3d
ed. 797 says that there are dicta in some cases that a justice is civilly
responsible when he acts maliciously or corruptly, but that they are not
well founded and that the express decisions are against them. An examination of the cases seems to confirm Cooley's view. See Kruegel v. Cobb,
(1910) 58 Tex. Civ. App. 449, 124 S. W. 723 for a recent case confirming
that view. The court quotes from Weaver v. Devendorf, (1846) 3 Denio
(N.Y.) 117 as follows:
"No public officer is responsible in a civil suit for judicial determination, however erroneous it may be, and however malicious the motive which
prompted it. Such acts when corrupt may be punished criminally, but
the law will not allow malice and corruption to be charged in a civil suit
against an officer for what he does in the performance of his duty. The
rule extends to judges from the highest to the lowest, to jurors and to
all public officers, whatever name they may bear, in the exercise of judicial
power." To the same effect are: Krugel v. Murphy, (Tex. 1910) 126 S. W.
343; Woodruff v. Stewart, (1879) 63 Aabama 393; Broom v. Douglas,
(1912) 175 Ala. 268, 57 So. 860; Kress v. State, (1878) 65 Ind. 106; See
also Philbrook v. Newman, (C.C. Calif. 1898) 85 Fed. 139.
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may have been corrupt and malicious, they would probably not be
liable for errors in judgment in enforcing an unconstitutional
statute. There seem to be no cases where that particular question came before the court. As to judges of inferior courts, we
saw that justices of the peace are held liable for acting under an
unconstitutional statute, though they act judicially, by the courts
which regard the statute as void ab initio. It is on the theory
that they acted without jurisdiction. It may be questioned whether
it was not within their jurisdiction to pass upon the constitutionality of the statute, and if so, they ought to be protected.
There is one class of cases where it seems particularly unjust
to hold the officer liable. That is where the officer executes a
warrant fair on its face. Ordinarily, such an officer is not liable
if the issuing officer had jurisdiction of the subject matter" and
the lack of jurisdiction was not apparent on the face of the warrant."' Now suppose that the warrant were issued by a justice
of the peace under an unconstitutional statute? There is the
same kind of a command to the officer to execute the warrant as
if it were issued under a valid statute. There is nothing to suggest to him that he is acting without authority. It seems that the
officer ought to be protected, but probably most of the courts,
which hold officers liable at all, would hold these ministerial officers liable. The writer of a note42 to Kelly v. Bemis in 1855
stated that it was the only case which goes to the extreme of holding a ministerial officer liable when he has acted under a warrant
fair on its face, though issued by a justice of the peace under an
unconstitutional statute. It seems that the writer is mistaken for
in Fisher v. McGir, 43 which was decided the year before, the
same court held a constable liable for seizing liquor under a warrant issued pursuant to a statute which was later declared unconstitutional. The constable was held liable on the theory that the
law, relied on for a justification of the officer's action being void,
gave the magistrate no jurisdiction and no authority to issue the
search warrant, and, therefore, the officer could not justify the
seizure under it. Since then there have been other cases holding
the officer liable where he executed a process issued under al unconstitutional statute.44 The injustice of holding such officers
0
CIarke v. May, (1854) 2 Gray (Mass.) 410.
4'Waterville v. Barton, (1876) 64 Me. 321.
42(1855) 64 Am. Dec. 50.
43(1854) 1 Gray (Mass.) 1, 61 Arm Dec. 50.
44Merritt v. City of St. Paul, (1866) 11 Minn. -3: Campbell v. Sherman, (1874) 35 Wis. 103.
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liable is brought out forcefully by a case like Campbell v. Sherinan, 45 where a sheriff was held liable for the conversion of a
large vessel. In that case an act of the legislature purported to
create a maritime lien on vessels, which lien was to be enforceable
by an action in rem. The circuit court of Wisconsin issued the
warrant commanding the sheriff to seize the vessel. When the
sheriff was sued for conversion after the statute had been declared unconstitutional, it was contended, on behalf of the defendant, that inasmuch as the warrant was fair and regular on its
face, it was not the duty of the sheriff to inquire whether the
court which issued it had jurisdiction. An argument was also
made on the point that the warrant was issued by a superior
court. Nevertheless, the supreme court of Wisconsin held the
sheriff liable, relying chiefly on the argument that ignorance of
the law does not excuse. It said:
"If the act which the writ commanded him to do was a trespass,
he was not required to perform it. Nor would he be liable in that
case to the plaintiff for refusing to execute a process void for want
of jurisdiction."
Such reasoning is not tenable, for at best the sheriff could only
make a guess as to the constitutionality of the statute. He had
no means of knowing that he was committing a trespass. Suppose he had refused to execute the process and the plaintiff had
sued him for refusal to do so: he would be liable for failure to perform his duty if the statute proved to be constitutional. The
sheriff did what any reasonable man would do in like circunistances for on the average the chances are that a statute will be
constitutional rather than unconstitutional. And looking at the
matter from a practical viewpoint, what would happen if every
subordinate officer questioned the validity of his orders before
proceeding to execution? The sensible view would seem to be
that which was expressed in State z,. 1vcNally; 6 the court held
that an officer is not liable when acting under a warrant fair on
its face though issued under an unconstitutional statute. The
court further held that it is no part of the officer's duty to examine into and decide upon the constitutionality or construction
of the statute which authorized the warrant."
45(1874) 35 Wis. 103.
49(1852) 34 Me. 210, 56 Am. Dec. 650.
4'For other cases holding a similar view see Ortman v. Greenman,
(1856) 4 Mich. 291; Trammell v. Russelville, (1879) 34 Ark. 105, 36 Am.
Rep. 1, and Brooks v. Mangan. (1891) 86 Mich. 576. 49 N. W. 633, 24
Am. St. Rep. 137.
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A question which is frequently raised in these suits against
officers is whether a ministerial officer may question the constitutionality of a statute, in mandamus proceedings against him. If
the officer may raise the question, it gives him one avenue of
escape from liability. He can wait until some one takes the
initiative in enforcing the statute, though it was pointed out above
that such delay was not desirable from the standpoint of good
government On the other hand, if the officer is not allowed to
raise the question of constitutionality in mandamus proceedings,
it is an additional argument in favor of exemption from liability.
It is unfair not to permit the officer to raise the issue of the validity of the statute, if he is to be held liable when the act is later
declared unconstitutional. When we look into the authorities we
find a conflict. 4s Some courts make a distinction between different classes of officers, allowing those of the higher grade to raise
the question but denying the privilege to those of the lower
grade. 9 For our purposes the interesting thing in these mandans cases is the reasoning of the courts. The chief argument of
the courts which refuse the officer the privilege of challenging
the validity of a statute is that a government whose laws can be
ignored by those whose duty it is to enforce them will be feeble
and likely to fail in its purpose.50 In State vt.
Heard," which is a
leading case holding that a ministerial officer cannot question the
constitutionality of a statute in madamus proceedings, the court
said:
"Executive officers of the state have no authorityto decline the
performance of purely ministerial duties which are imposed upon
them by law, on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution.
Laws are presumed to be and must be treated and acted upon by
subordinate functionaries as constitutional and legal, until their
unconstitutionality or illegality is judicially established, for in a
well regulated government obedience to its laws by executive officers is absolutely essential and of paramount importance. Were
it not so, the most inextricable confusion would inevitably result,
and produce such collusion in the administration of public affairs
48For a more complete discussion of the subject, see 19 Am. & Eng.
Ency. of Law 2d ed. 764; 12 C. J. 765; 47 L R. A. 512; 72 Cent. L. Jour.
301. 49
Maynard v. Board of Canvassers, (1889) 84 Mich. 228, 47 N. W. 756;
v. Mathues, (1904) 210 Pa. 372, 59 At. 961.
Commonwealth
50
State v. Leech, (1916) 33 N. D. 513, 157 N. W. 492; State v.Shakespeare, (1889) 41 La. Ann. 156, 6 So. 592; State v. Heard, (1895) 47 La.
Ann. 1679, 18 So. 746, 47 L. R.A. 512; People ex rel. v. Salomon, (1850) 54
I1. 39.
11(1895)
471La. Ann. 1679, 18 So. 746. 47 L. R_ A. 512.
5
-Gilmer v. Holton, (1887) 98 N. C. 26. 3 S.E. 812.
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as to materially impede the proper and necessary operations of the
Government."
Another court stated that the officer ought to be permitted to
raise the issue only in cases of "plain and palpable" violations of
the constitution, or where irreparable harm may follow., 2 Another reason given is that the officer is not affected and that only
those affected can properly raise the issue of constitutionality."3
Still other courts refuse to allow the issue to be raised on the
ground that the law is presumed to be valid until declared unconstitutional. 54 And some courts content themselves with merely
saying that the defendant cannot raise the issue because he is a
ministerial officer. 5 It is evident that there is no uniformity in
the reasoning of the cases denying the right to raise the issue of
constitutionality in mandamus proceedings, but these same courts
are quite agreed that the officer should enforce the law as he finds
it. If that view is sound, it leads to the logical conclusion that
the officer should be protected when the statute under which he
acted is declared unconstitutional.
The embarrassing position of the ministerial officer under our
present state of the law is well illustrated by the case of People
ex rel. v. Salomon. 6 A clerk of court refused to obey a l)ereniptory writ of mandamus because he doubted the constitutionality
of the law under which the board of equalization acted and at
whose instance the writ was issued. The defendant had refused to
extend upon the collector's books the taxes according to the increased valuation of the state board of equalization. The court
held that the clerk could not justify his refusal on the ground that
the statute might be unconstitutional and fined him one thousand
dollars. The attitude of the court is well summarized in the following excerpt:
"To allow a ministerial officer to decide upon the validity of a
law, would be subversive of the great objects and purposes of the
government, for if one such officer may assume infallibility, all
other like officers may do the same, and thus an end be put to
civil government, one of whose cardinal principles is subjection
53Mohall Farmers State Elevator Co. v. Hall, (1920) 44 N. D. 430,
176 N. W. 131.
54State v. Cease, (1911) 28 Okla. 271, 114 Pac. 251, and State v.
Heard,
(1895) 47 La. Ann. 1679, 18 So. 746, 47 L, R. A. 512.
55
Estus v. State, (1921) 83 Okla. 181, 200 Pac. 1002; Conmonwealth
v. James, (1890) 135 Pa. 480, 19 Atd. 950; United States ex rel. Marble
(1883) 3 Mackey (D.C.) 49; State v. Tyler, (1922) 64 Mont. 124, 208
Pac. 1081.
56People ex rel. v. Salomon, (1850) 54 Ill. 39.
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to law. Being a ministerial officer, the path of duty was plain before you . ..your duty was obedience. The collective will of
the people was embodied in that law. A decent respect to them
required that all their servants should obey it."
Turning to the courts which permit ministerial officers to question the constitutionality of statutes in mandamus proceedings,
we again find that there is no uniformity in the reasoning. One
court says that it is a matter of convenience to have the question
of constitutionality settled at the outset.2 7 Other courts say that
an unconstitutional statute is no law and binds no one and that
therefore the constitutionality can be questioned by any one in
direct proceedings."8 Another group reasons that it is the duty
of certain public officials, particularly financial officers, to raise
the question of constitutionality before paying out public funds
if there is any doubt about the matter. 9 Still others permit the
issue to be raised chiefly for the reason that the officer is subject to
liability if he acts under unconstitutional statutes.A0
It is evident that there is much conflict concerning the right
of a ministerial officer to raise the issue of constitutionality in
mandamus proceedings against him; and the decisions cannot be
reconciled. But it seems that under either view the officer should
be permitted to raise the issue if the result of his action, in event
that the statute is declared unconstitutional, would be a violation
of his duty under his oath of office, or would otherwise render
him liable.
One other reason, not mentioned by the courts but which, it
seems, might be legitimately advanced in support of exempting
the officer, is that in many cases the injured party could have protected himself by injunction proceedings in advance of the injury. There are many cases where that has been effectively
done."' For instance, in a Nebraska case 2 the legislature passed
5-Hindman v. Boyd, (1906) 42 Wash. 17, 84 Pac. 609.
5
SMcDermott v. Dinnie, (1897) 6 N. D. 278, 69 N. W. 2 ; Commonweath v. ldathues, (1904) 210 Pa. 372, 59 Atl. 961; Denman v. Broderick,
(1896) 111 Cal. 96, 43 Pac. 516; Van Horn v. State, (1895) 46 Neb. 62,
64 N.9 W. 365.
5 Norman v. The Ky. Board of Managers, (1892) 93 Ky. 537, 20 S. W.
901; Stockton v. Leddy, (1912) 55 Colo. 24, 129 Pac. 220; Denman v.
Broderick, (1896) 111 Cal. 96, 43 Pac. 516; State v. Snyder, (1923) 29
Wyo.0 163, 212 Pac. 758.
OState ex rel. University of Utah v. Candaland. (1909) 36 Utah 406.
104 Pac. 285, 140 Am. St. Rep. 834; State v. Malcolm, (1924) 39 Idaho
185, 226
Pac. 1083.
1
'Minneapolis Brewing Co. v. McGillivary, (C.C. S.D. 1900) 104 Fcd.
258; Central Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Citizens St. Ry. Co., (C.C. Ind. 1897)
80 Fed. £18; Dahler v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, (1919)
133 Md. 644, 106 AtI. 10; Smyth v. Ames. (1897) 169 U. S.466, 18 Sup.
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a law creating a stallion registration board. The owner of a stallion refused to register his stallion and pay the registration fees
on the ground that the law was unconstitutional since the executive offices are enumerated in the constitution; and because under
the decisions of the state courts such an office would be an additional executive office. The statute was later held invalid on
the above grounds, but in the meantime the courts restrained the
board from taking any action against the owner. So, in those
cases where the plaintiff could have secured an injunction, is it not
fair that he should be made to assert his rights earlier rather than
place the burden on the officer when the statute is later held invalid? Let the plaintiff do some of the guessing as to whether
the statute is constitutional. There are, however, courts which
place a very heavy burden upon the plaintiff of showing almost
conclusively that the statute is unconstitutional, and that its enforcement would inflict a direct injury upon him for which lie
could have no other redress 3 before they will issue an injunction.
Of course, in those courts our argument would not hold good.
But many of the equity courts are rather lenient in granting injunctions and will even restrain the enforcement of a criminal
statute where irreparable injury would result.0 4 Where there
would be no serious injury to property, equity courts would follow the general rule that they will not ordinarily enjoin criminal
prosecutions;G5 in such cases the plaintiff's only redress may be
against the officer.
It also falls within the scope of this paper to consider the liability and protection of de facto officers. Most of the courts hold
Ct. 418, 42 L. Ed. 819; Yale College v. Sanger. (C.C. Conn. 1894) 62
Fed. 177; Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, (1890) 140 U. S. 1, 11 Sup. Ct.
699, 35 L. Ed. 363; Scott v. Donald, (1897) 165 U. S. 107, 17 Sup. Ct.
262, 41 L. Ed. 648; Davis v. Gray, (1872) 16 Wall. (U:S.) 203, 21 L. Ed.
447; Bonnett v. Vallier, (1908) 136 Wis. 193, 116 N. W. 885, 128 Am. St.
Rep. 1061, and Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, (1912) 223 U. S. 605, 32 Sup.
Ct. 340,
56 L. Ed. 570.
62 Iams v. Mellor, (1913) 93 Neb. 438, 140 N. W. 784.
OaGibbs v. Green, (1877) 54 Miss. 592; Cohen v. Commissioners of
Goldsboro, (1877) 77 N. C. 2.
64Truax v. Raich, (1915) 239 U. S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct. 7, 60 L. Ed. 131.
L. R. A. 1916D 545; Davis & Farnum Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, (1903)
189 U. S. 207, 23 Sup. Ct. 498, 47 L. Ed. 778; Dobbins v. Los Angeles,
(1904) 195 U. S. 223, 25 Sup. Ct. 18, 49 L. Ed. 169: Ex Parte Young,
(1908) 209 U. S. 123, 28 Sup. Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 714. 13 L. R. A. (N.S.)
932. See also Terrace v. Thompson, (1923) 263 U. S' 197 68 L. Ed.
255. 44 Sup. Ct. 15; Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, (192 5) 266 U. S.
69 L. Ed. 402, 45 Sup. Ct. 141.
497, 65
1n re Sawyer et al., (1887) 124 U. S. 200. 8 Sup. Ct. 482, 31 L. Ed.
402; City of Ranger v. Southern Ice Co. and Utilities Co., (Tex. Civ. App.
1924) 262 S. W. 839; Sokel v. Roche, (1888) 27 Ill. App. 423.
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that there can be no officer de facto where there is no de jure office.
From that it follows that where there was an attempt to
create an office under an unconstitutional statute there can be no
de facto officer and, consequently, the party would not be entitled
even to the benefits which de facto officers ordinarily share under'
the law. It has been held in a number of cases that de facto officers are entitled to the salary where they have performed the
duties of the office and there are no other claimantsY Though
there is also some authority to the contrary,6s it would seem that
such officers should be paid, since the public has had the benefit
of their services as much as if they were de jure officers. But
where the courts hold that there can not be even a de facto office
created under an unconstitutional statute, they would logically
have to hold that the person occupying the office is not entitled
to the benefits of a de facto officer. So in Nagel v. Bosworth"I
the Kentucky court, by way of dictum, said that the judge whose
circuit was created under an unconstitutional statute and who
had served six months was not entitled to compensation. But in
State v. Poident7 the Maine supreme court was of the opinion
that an office created under an unconstitutional statute should be
treated as de jure until declared otherwise by a competent tribunal. With the exception of Nagel v. Bosworth all the cases, where
the question has been passed upon, support the views of the Maine
court.
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As the law stands today in the great majority of states, officers are penalized when they act in utmost good faith in enforc66Mechem, Public Officers, sec. 324, 325; 29 Cyc. 1391: Norton v. Shelby County, (1886) 118 U. -S. 425, 6 Sup. Ct. 1121, 30 L. Ed. 178; Flaucher
v. City of Camden, (1893) 56 N. 3. L. 244, 28 Atl. 82; Coquillard Wagon
Works v. Melton, (1910) 137 Ky. 189, 125 S. W. 291; State ex rel. Elliot
v. Kelly, (1913) 154 Wis. 482, 143 N. W. 153. For a discussion of the
status of a person holding office under an unconstitutional statute see 13
Ill. L. Rev. 229. Also State v. Carrol, (1891) 38 Conn. 449, 9 Am. Rep.
409; People v. Knopf, (1899) 183 Ill. 410, 56 N. E. 155.
67State ex rel. Elliot v. Kelly, (1913) 154 Wis. 482. 143 N. W. 153:
-Malaley v. City of Marysville, (1918) 37 Calif. App. 638, 174 Pac. 367;
Lavin v. Commissioners of Cook County, (1910) 245 Ill. 496, 92 N. E. 291.
6sMeagher v. Storey County, (1869) 5 Nev. 244.
69(1912) 148 Ky. 807, 147 S. W. 940.
70(1909) 105-Me. 224, 74 AUt. 119.
7"Burt v. Winona & St Peter Ry. Co., (1884) 31 .Minn. 472, 18 N. W.
285, State v. Bailey, (1908) 106 Minn. 138, 118 N. W. 676; Nagel v. Bosworth, (1912) 148 Ky. 807, 147 S. W. 940; Rude v. Sisack, (1908) 44
Colo. 21, 96 Pac. 976: Lang v. Mayor of City of Bayonne, (1907) 74
N. 3. L. 455, 68 Atl. 90, 15 L. R. A. (N.S.) 93, 122 Am. St. Rep. 391, 12
Ann. Cas. 961; see also Adams v. Lindell, (1878) 5 Mo. App. 197 where
it was held that there was a de facto officer even after the office was
abolished.
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ing statutes which are later held invalid. The awkward position
of the officer where the situation is reversed is well illustrated by
a New York case. 72 The plaintiff brought an action against a
town supervisor because of failure to perform his duty of presenting the plaintiff's claim to the county board of supervisors for
audit. A new law provided that when a man's land is taken for
a road the damages should be assessed by three commissioners
appointed by the county court. The law also provided for reassessment by a jury if the owner was not satisfied with the assessment of the commissioners, and made it the duty of the town
supervisors to present such reassessment to the county board of
supervisors. The plaintiff obtained a reassessment by a jury and
requested the defendant to present it, but the defendant refused
on the ground that he thought the law was unconstitutional. Later
the law was held valid and the defendant was held liable for the
full amount of the assessment, the court saying:
"In this course he was not justified, unless the law in question
is actually unconstitutional. Under our system of government no
power is given to public officers to refuse or suspend their obedience to laws on any opinion of their own that the law is unconstitutional. If, on the other hand, it is constitutional, it binds
everyone to obedience. Disobedience on such a ground is always
at the peril of the party disobeying, whether a private individual.
a public officer, or a board of public officers. That the defendant
thought the law unconstitutional, and that this view was shared
by the town officers, and that his refusal to obey that statute went
upon that ground, is, in a legal point of view, of no consequence.
It may affect the moral quality of his acts. but it does not alter
his legal responsibility."
So the officer is in a nice predicament. If he acts under a
statute and it proves to be unconstitutional, he is liable for damages, and if he refuses to act because he thinks the statute is nconstitutional and later the courts hold the law to be valid, he is
no better off.
The proper solution of the problem would seem to be to let
the officer enforce the law as he finds it and not to require him to
pass upon its constitutionality. The state should assume the responsibility for all injury due to the enforcement of unconstitutional statutes. It might develop the practice of allowing the injured party to sue the officer and then reimburse him from the
state treasury. England has developed that system in respect to
'-Clark v. Miller. (1874) 54 N. Y. 528.
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suits in tort.7 3 It is unfair and socially undesirable that the subordinate officers of the government should assume the risk of
constitutionality of legislative enactments. In recent years there
has been a growing legislative tendency on the part of both the
state and the national governments to assume liability to a greater
degree for the torts of their servants. The reasons for assuming
responsibility for injury caused because of the enforcement of
unconstitutional statutes are even more cogent. When the government refuses to indemnify for the torts of its servants there
is an injustice to the injured party. In the officer cases there is
not only the same injustice but, in addition, we discourage the
enforcement of the laws.
Legislatures pass laws for the benefit of all and even the most
careful and conscientious legislatures will pass some laws which
will be held unconstitutional. To discharge their functions properly, legislatures must necessarily do considerable experimenting.
If the experiment succeeds, the people reap the benefits and it is
only fair if it fails, the burden be so distributed as to be borne
by all. Many years ago the state of New York came to realize
that it was impolitic to make health officers bear the risk of "good
faith" mistakes and it passed a statute"' exempting health officers
from liability for such mistakes and for omissions in the performance of their duties. In order to avoid injustice to the injured party, the statute permitted the city to be sued in such cases.
And in the field of criminal law, two states have passed laws providing for compensation to innocent parties who have been erroneously convicted of crime.7 They go on the theory that the state
has by mistake deprived the individual of his liberty in performing the public function of protecting the rest of society. The
two states recognized the injustice of imposing the burden upon
the private individual. So there are ways and means of remedying the situation if we will but recognize the injustice of imposing liability on the officer. We have done little to encourage our
officers in the faithful performance of their duties. We are far
behind continental countries in that respect. In France the government has gone a long way in protecting its servants and the
practical effect of the laws in that country is that if the damage
was done by an official of the state while acting officially the state
may be liable, but the official is never liable. It is only where the
Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L. Jour. 1, 13.
7ABorchard,
7
4N. Y. Laws 1901, see 466, sec 1196.
5
7 Cal. Stat. 1913, ch. 165; Wis. Stat. 1921, sec. 320a.
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official clearly goes outside of his functions that he would be held
responsible.7 1 There is no doubt that an officer would be free
from liability in France in the type of cases with which we are
concerned in this discussion. In England there is also some legislation protecting public officers. 7

In the United States practical-

ly nothing has been done to encourage the officer in the prompt
performance of his duties. As the law stands there is an injustice done to the officer as well as to the party injured by the enforcement of the unconstitutional statute. And in addition to that
we have a shirking of a responsibility by the state which it ought
78

to bear.
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See F. P. Walton, The French Administrative Courts and the Modern
French Law as to the Responsibility of the State for the Faults of its
Officials, (1918) 13 IIl. L. Rev. 205. Also H. Laski, Responsibility of the
State in England, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 447.
77On the liability of officers in England see Chaster, Public Officers,
617-706; J. S. Chartres, Protection of Public Authorities 1-10; Emden,
the Scope
of the Public Authorities Protection Act, 39 L. Q. Rev. 341.
7
8The writer found that the cases under consideration in this study
were not well classified in the digests and for that reason deemed it
advisable to include all cases that have not been previously cited in this
note. Other cases holding the officer liable are: Dennison Mfg. Co. v.
Wright, (1923) 156 Ga. 789, 120 S. E. 120; Waterloo Woolen Mfg. Co. v.
Shanahan, (1890) 58 Hun 50, 11 N. Y. S. 829, 33 N. Y. St. Rep. 361; see
also Hopkins v. Clemson College, (1911) 221 U. S. 636, 31 Sup. Ct. 654,
55 L. Ed. 890; Huntington v. Worthen, (1887) 120 U. S. 97, 7 Sup. Ct.
469, 30 L. Ed. 588; Kinneen v. Wells, (1887) 144 Mass. 497, 11 N. E. 916.
59 Am. Rep. 105; Astrom v. Hammond, (C.C. 7th cir. 1842) 3 McLean
107; Saratoga State Waters Corporation v. Pratt, (1920) 227 N. Y. 429,
125 N. E. 834; contra: Shafford v. Brown, (1908) 49 Wash. 307, 95 Pac.
270; Schloss v. McIntyre, (1906) 147 Ala. 557, 41 So. 11. See also Miller
v. Dunn, (1887) 72 Calif. 462, 14 Pac. 27.

